Until taxes do us part: tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision by Barigozzi, Francesca et al.
 17‐858	
	
	
	
“Until	taxes	do	us	part:	tax	penalties	or	bonuses	and	the	
marriage	decision”	
	
	
	
Francesca	Barigozzi,	Helmuth	Cremer	and	Kerstin	Roeder	
November	2017	
Until taxes do us part: tax penalties or bonuses and the
marriage decision
Francesca Barigozzi1 Helmuth Cremer2 Kerstin Roeder3
October 2017
1University of Bologna, Italy, Email: francesca.barigozzi@unibo.it.
2Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, France, Email:
helmuth.cremer@tse-fr.eu.
3University of Augsburg, Germany, Email: kerstin.roeder@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de.
Abstract
The tax regimes applied to couples in many countries including the US, France, and
Germany imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. We study how they affect
the decision to get married by considering two potential spouses who play a marriage
proposal game. At the end of the game they may get married, live together without
formal marriage, or split up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is
costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property we obtain is that a marriage
bonus may actually reduce the probability that a couple gets married. If the bonus is
sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium
in which fewer couples get married remains. Similarly, a marriage penalty may increase
the marriage probability. Specifically, the penalty may lead to a separating equilibrium
with efficiency enhancing information transmission, which was otherwise not possible.
Our results also imply that marriage decisions in the laissez-faire are not necessarily
privately optimal. In some cases a bonus or a penalty may effectively make the marriage
decision more efficient; it may increase the number of efficient marriages that otherwise
may not be concluded.
JEL classification: J12, D82, H31
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My most brilliant achievement was my ability to be able to persuade my wife to marry
me.
Winston Churchill
1 Introduction
Except when income taxes are purely individual based, the tax regimes applied to
couples typically imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. A marriage
penalty involves higher taxes for married couples than for two otherwise identical single
individuals with exactly the same income; a bonus implies lower taxes for married
couples. A marriage penalty applies, for instance, in the US; see Alm et al. (1999).
In France or Germany, on the other hand, there is a marriage bonus due to income
splitting.1 While there appears to be a trend towards more individualized tax systems,
very few systems are effectively completely neutral with respect to the marital status;
see OECD (2005; 2017). Table I2.3 in OECD (2015) shows that a majority of countries
nominally have an individual based tax system. Table I2.1, on the other hand, shows
that this is very often just a matter of legal terminology. Even when the tax unit is
referred to as individual based, there is in most instances some correction reflecting the
marital status.
To sum up, in reality in most tax systems a couple’s tax liability depends on its
marital status. Many systems are less extreme than the French or the German ones,
but they are nevertheless not completely neutral. Consequently, they potentially affect
a couple’s decision to get married in the first place. Empirical papers suggest that the
bonus or penalty have little impact on the marriage decision, which is rather surprising
since the bonus can be rather sizeable like in France or Germany; see Leturcq (2012)
for an overview of this literature.2
1In France and Germany each spouse’s taxable income is defined as half of total family income. The
couple’s total tax liability is then twice the tax calculated for each spouse. Because of the concavity of
the tax function this reduces the couples’ tax liability unless both spouses have identical incomes or, at
least, are in the same tax bracket.
2Leturcq (2012) concentrates on civil unions rather than on marriage. However, in the introduction
1
The existing theoretical literature on couple taxation mostly ignores how taxation
affects the decision to get married.3 As pointed out by Kaplow (2008, page 342) “... a
scheme that is ideal on distributive grounds is likely to influence marriage decisions.”In
other words, it is unlikely that a purely individualistic tax (which would be neutral with
regard to the marriage decision) is optimal.”4 But it is not clear whether this optimal
joint taxation fosters or discourages marriages. In principle, this can go both ways: with
a German or French style income splitting it “pays”to get married (as long as spouses
have different incomes), while the US system goes in the opposite direction. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no general result in tax theory concerning the desirability of
a marriage bonus or penalty. Either way, assuming that the marriage decision would be
otherwise privately optimal, the effect a tax system has on this decision represents an
extra distortion, which should be accounted for when designing the optimal policy.
In this paper we study the impact of a marriage bonus or penalty on the decision
to get married. From a positive perspective, this provides an analysis of how real world
tax systems affect the decision to get married. But first and foremost our analysis is
meant to provide guidance to future research on the optimal taxation of couples. As
Kaplow puts it, the impact of a tax system on the decision to get married represents
an additional distortion to be accounted for in couple taxation models. We show that
this distortion may be far more complex than one could expect. Specifically, we show
that a marriage bonus may not increase the number of marriages while a penalty may
induce additional marriages. Furthermore, Kaplow’s implicit assumption that in the
she extensively discusses the literature which has looked at the impact of the tax system on marriage,
mainly in the US, but also in France.
3See, for instance, Boskin and Sheshinski, (1983); Apps and Rees (1999); Cremer, Lozachmeur and
Pestieau (2012), or, more recently, Cremer et al. (2016). Chade and Ventura (2002) do study tax
design with endogenous marriages, but they focus on tax reform rather than on optimal taxation. They
consider a marriage-market model with search frictions and heterogeneous agents. They show that
reforms leading to more neutral systems (which for the US means reducing the marriage penalty) may
increase or decrease the number of couples who get married. In a follow up paper Chade and Ventura
(2005) consider a simplified version of their model for which they can study tax optimization albeit with
very restricted instruments. They show that it is optimal to give a married couple a preferential tax
treatment for this allows to correct an inefficiency in the matching process.
4For a given family structure, the optimal tax schedule is determined by a number of possibly
conflicting effects. These include issues of redistribution between and within couples, labor supply
elasticities (Ramsey considerations), efficiency of household production, etc.; see Apps and Rees (2009,
Ch 6); or Kaplow (2008, Ch 12) for detailed overviews.
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laissez-faire the marriage decision is privately optimal may not be true. In other words,
the “distortion” of the individual marriage decision implied by the tax system may
effectively be welfare improving.
We consider a model where two potential spouses play a marriage proposal game
at the end of which they may get married, live together without formal marriage, or
split up. This is a signaling game where proposing, or more generally getting married,
is costly but can indicate strong love (a high quality match). The striking property we
obtain is that a marriage bonus may actually reduce the probability that a couple gets
married. If it is sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and there is
only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer potential couples get married. Similarly, a
marriage penalty may increase the marriage probability. Specifically, the penalty may
lead to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission,
which was otherwise not possible.
This setting is rather specific, but the results suggest that integrating the decision
to get married into a family taxation model may have to account for a priori sur-
prising behavioral responses. A marriage subsidy may not enhance marriages while a
penalty does not necessarily discourage marriages. Furthermore, marriage decisions in
the laissez-faire are not necessarily efficient. This is quite in line with the empirical
results which show little impact at the aggregate level. Since the effect can go both
ways (depending on the couple’s characteristics) on aggregate these will cancel out (in
part). Another interesting lesson is that the impact of the tax system on the marriage
decision does not necessarily represent a “distortion”, that is a welfare cost. In some
cases a bonus or a penalty may effectively make the marriage decision more efficient; it
may increase the number of efficient marriages that otherwise may not be concluded.
Signaling in the marriage market has been analyzed as a mean to overcome asym-
metric information and allow profitable matching. However, earlier studies emphasize
the role of status goods and conspicuous consumption as signals of income, which repre-
sents a crucial but unobservable characteristic evaluated by potential partners (see De
Fraja 2009, Bronsert et al. 2016, and references within).5 Our signaling model has a
5De Fraja (2009) explicitly links utility maximization to the biological problem of fitness maximiza-
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different focus. First potential partner signal their feelings and not other material char-
acteristics. Second, in line with Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), it examines how pecuniary
incentives might interact with individuals’ intrinsic motivation by diluting the signaling
value of (virtuous) behavior.
2 The Model
2.1 The marriage proposal game
Sam (S) and Robin (R), any gender, are two potential partners who interact strategi-
cally.6 Sam’s unobservable feelings for Robin are represented by the parameter θS ∈
{θL, θH} with θH > θL > 0. With probability λ Sam’s love is strong (θS = θH), with
probability 1− λ it is weak (θS = θL). This parameter determines the partners’ utility
if they remain together.
Sam chooses the action aS ∈ {0, c,m}. Specifically, if aS = m Sam asks Robin
for marriage; if aS = c (cohabitation or civil union) Sam asks Robin to live together
without formal marriage. Finally, when aS = 0 Sam breaks the relationship. In this case
the game ends and both partners receive their reservation utilities US and UR, where
US ,UR > 0 represent possible future matches with other potential partners. To ensure
that Robin’s incomplete information about Sam’s feelings is relevant for the outcome,
we assume throughout the paper that
E [θS ] = λθH + (1− λ)θL < UR, (1)
θL < UR < θH . (2)
In words, condition (1) implies that absent any information acquisition, Robin’s ex-
pected value of θS is smaller than her reservation utility. Consequently, Robin prefers
tion and survival. Bronsert et al. (2016) present a model where a woman interested in the wealth of
a potential husband designs a screening mechanism by assigning a probability of marriage to possi-
ble amounts of wasteful consumption. Hence, screening leads to status consumption and wasteful gift
giving.
6As illustrated by the choice of the player’s name our game is meant to represent the proposal game
of any pair of potential partners irrespective of their gender. This gender neutrality is implicit in all
our arguments even though we often refer to Sam as “he” and Robin as “she”. This concession turned
out to be necessary to keep avoid the tedious “he or she”. Using the plural of the singular “they” would
have made many statements ambiguous.
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to look for a new partner when the initial uncertainty about Sam’s love persists. Con-
dition (2), on the other hand, implies that Robin wants to accept Sam’s proposal if she
knows for sure that his love is strong (θS = θH), while she would refuse the proposal if
she knew that his feelings are weak (θS = θL).
Sam’s action implies a cost ϕS(aS). We assume that ϕS(0) = ϕS(c) = 0, while
ϕS(m) = Φ− θS , where Φ > θH > θL. The function ϕS(·) captures the costs associated
with the marriage proposal. In particular, the marriage proposal entails time consuming
and costly activities such as planning the perfect arrangement for the proposal and
buying the engagement ring. Furthermore, with some probability the couple may split
up through a costly divorce.7
This cost decreases with θS , the intensity of Sam’s feelings, for example because
Sam enjoys, to a certain extent, planning for the proposal and spending money for the
engagement ring and this is especially true when he is deeply in love with Robin.
After observing Sam’s action, Robin chooses aR ∈ {y, n}, meaning that Robin can
either accept Sam’s proposal (aR = y) or break the relationship (aR = n).
The two partners’ utilities are given by
UR = (1− I)UR + IθS ,
US = (1− I)US + I [kθS − ϕS(aS)] ,
where I is an indicator function which takes the value I = 1 if aS ∈ {c,m} along with
aR = y (Sam and Robin stay together) and the value I = 0 otherwise (either Sam or
Robin breaks the relationship). When Robin and Sam remain together, their utilities
are increasing in Sam’s love. The parameter k measures the extent to which Sam enjoys
living with Robin. Our main results are obtained for the case where k is large enough
to ensure kθH > kθL ≥ US . This implies that Sam always prefers to remain with Robin
if the proposal cost ϕS(aS) is not too large. Recall that from assumptions (1) and (2)
Robin always prefers to look for a new partner when Sam’s feelings are weak, or when
she is uncertain about Sam’s feelings, that is θL < E [θS ] < UR.
7In an alternative interpretation to our model, one can think of the expected cost of divorce as a
commitment device signaling a good match; see Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Game tree.
This is the most interesting case because it implies that Sam’s and Robin’s prefer-
ences are not perfectly aligned. This creates some incentives to lie. Specifically, when
weakly in love Sam has an incentive to try to persuade Robin that he is deeply in love
in order to stay together. As a consequence, a simple communication like “I am deeply
in love with you” would represent mere cheap talk and would not be credible. Con-
versely, when deeply in love Sam may want to invest in a costly proposal to make the
transmission of information about his feelings credible.8
The timing of actions is the following. First, Nature draws the type of Sam,
θS ∈ {θL, θH}, which is observable to Sam but not to Robin. Robin only knows the
distribution of types. Then, Sam chooses aS ∈ {0, c,m}. After observing Sam’s action,
Robin chooses aR ∈ {y, n}. Figure 1 represents the extensive form of the game.
Given that Sam knows θS , Sam’s action potentially transmits some information to
Robin about Sam’s love. When observing Sam’s action, Robin updates her beliefs using
8To show the significance of this assumption, we shall also briefly examine the case where the two
partner’s preferences are aligned, that is when kθH > US > kθL; see the last paragraph of the next
Section.
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Bayes rule. Let λ˜ (aS) denote Robin’s posterior belief about Sam’s feelings being strong.
Robin’s utility when staying with Sam can then be rewritten as
UR = E [θS |aS ] = λ˜ (aS) θH +
(
1− λ˜ (aS)
)
θL.
Robin will choose to remain with Sam (aR = y) if and only if her posterior beliefs
λ˜(aS) are sufficiently large. Conversely, given θL < E [θS ] < UR , Robin will break the
relationship when learning that Sam’s feeling are weak, or when there is no information
transmission.
We will focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in pure strategies.
2.2 Marriage or cohabitation?
Let us determine the conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists. We are in-
terested in a separating equilibrium where Sam signals to be strongly in love (θS = θH)
by choosing the marriage proposal (aS = m) and where Robin, by observing the mar-
riage proposal, infers that θS = θH and chooses aR = y. Conversely, when Sam’s
feelings are weak (θS = θL), Sam optimally chooses aS = c, Robin infers that θS = θL
and chooses aR = n. Posterior beliefs are then λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c) = 0.
This separating equilibrium exists if the two partners’ incentive compatibility con-
straints are satisfied. In particular, when θS = θH , Sam must prefer to pay the cost
of the marriage proposal and to be perceived as strongly in love instead of proposing
cohabitation, and being perceived as weakly in love, in which case Robin would break
the relationship. This requires
(k + 1) θH − Φ ≥ US . (ICH)
When instead θS = θL, Sam must prefer asking to live together, being perceived as
weakly in love and remaining without a partner instead of asking for marriage and
being perceived as strongly in love, that is
US ≥ (k + 1) θL − Φ. (ICL)
From (ICH) and (ICL) a separating equilibrium in which the players’ best replies are
given by [(aS (θH) = m, aR (m) = y) ; (aS (θL) = c, aR (c) = n)] exists if the following
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condition holds
(k + 1) θL − Φ ≤ US ≤ (k + 1) θH − Φ. (3)
Given that the cost of the marriage proposal is higher for a type-θL than for a type-
θH Sam, the interval [(k + 1) θL − Φ; (k + 1) θH − Φ] is not empty and the separating
equilibrium we are studying is feasible.
Our assumptions then imply that Robin’s choices are optimal for her updated beliefs,
λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c) = 0, and given Sam’s strategies. Specifically, when aS = c Robin’s
optimal choice is to break the relationship because, UR = λ˜ (c) θH+
(
1− λ˜ (c)
)
θL =
θL < UR; see Condition (2). When instead aS = m, Robin’s optimal choice is to accept
the proposal if UR = λ˜ (m) θH+
(
1− λ˜ (m)
)
θL = θH > UR, which follows again from
Condition (2).
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain this separating equilibrium are, for instance,
given by λ˜ (aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= m.
What happens when (3) is not satisfied? Suppose first that US < (k + 1) θL − Φ so
that (ICL) is violated. In this case it would be optimal for Sam to propose marriage
irrespective of his type. But Sam’s action then transmits no information and Robin
would break the relationship because she cannot be sure about Sam’s love (E [θS ] < UR).
Hence, Sam does not make a costly marriage proposal in the first place but suggests
cohabitation aS = c ∀θS , which is refused by Sam.
Finally, suppose that (ICH) is not satisfied because (k + 1) θH − Φ < US . Then,
Sam’s optimal strategy is aS = c, ∀θS . Once again, Sam’s action does not provide any
information about his type and Robin prefers to break the relationship. To sum up,
when the incentive constraint of either of Sam’s types is violated there is a pooling
equilibrium described by [aS(θH) = aS(θL) = c; aR(c) = n]. The following proposition
summarizes results obtained so far.
Proposition 1 (Signaling without bonus/penalty) Suppose that kθH > kθL ≥
US:
(i) Separation with marriage. If (3) is satisfied, then the separating equilibrium
[(aS (θH) = m, aR (m) = y); (aS (θL) = c, aR (c) = n)] exists with posterior
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beliefs λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c) = 0 (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs as λ˜ (aS)
= 0 ∀aS 6= m). In words: Sam asks Robin for marriage when strongly in love
and proposes cohabitation when weakly in love. Robin infers Sam’s type from his
action and thus accepts the marriage proposal while refusing cohabitation.
(ii) Pooling with no marriage. If (3) does not hold, then only a pooling equilibrium
of the type [aS(θH) = aS(θL) = c; aR(c) = n] exists, where posterior beliefs are
λ˜ (c) = λ (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs are λ˜ (aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= c) In words:
Sam proposes cohabitation irrespective of his type. No information transmission
occurs and Robin refuses cohabitation so that the couple always breaks.
When (3) is satisfied, signaling allows information disclosure so that partners whose
utility from living together is high are able to benefit from their good prospects. Po-
tential partners who are weakly in love optimally opt for the outside-option and their
relationship breaks. In this case, the signaling mechanism is beneficial from a welfare
perspective because it allows the potential partners to overcome the problem of asym-
metric information so that the “efficient” marriages are made possible. However, the
information transmission comes at a cost, which the deeply in love Sam has to pay to
signal his love and separate from the weakly in love Sam. From a welfare perspective
this cost represents a waste as Robin draws no direct utility from Sam’s signaling ex-
penditure. Still, the signaling and the associated information transmission brings about
a welfare gain.9 In next section we show how a marriage subsidy affects this (virtuous)
signaling mechanism.
Equilibria with cohabitation only emerge when Sam’s and Robin’s preferences are
fully aligned implying that Sam does not need to pay any cost in order to credibly
transmit information. To illustrate this, consider the case where kθH > US ≥ kθL,
meaning that both Sam and Robin would like to stay together only if Sam is deeply
in love. A separating equilibrium with cohabitation emerges such that [(aS (θH) = c,
aR (c) = y); (aS (θL) = 0, aR (0) = n)] and with posterior beliefs λ˜ (c) = 1 (and out-
9Obviously, less costly and thus more efficient signaling mechanisms might be feasible. As an example,
in the Appendix we present a slightly different specification of our model that may generate a more
efficient signaling mechanism because only a fraction of deeply-in-love Sam pay the cost of signaling.
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of-equilibrium beliefs λ˜ (aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= c). In words, Sam asks Robin to live together
when strongly in love and breaks the relationship when weakly in love. Robin infers
Sam’s type from his action and thus accepts cohabitation when asked for. In this case
marriage never occurs in equilibrium.
3 Marriage or cohabitation under a marriage bonus
Suppose now that the tax regime of couples translates into a bonus B > 0 for married
couples. Assume that B is equally shared between the two partners so that it reduces
the cost of the marriage proposal to ϕBS (m) = Φ− θS −B/2. Robin’s utility in case of
marriage becomes
UR = λ˜ (aS) θH +
(
1− λ˜ (aS)
)
θL +B/2,
and Sam’s incentive constraints are now given by
(k + 1) θH − Φ + B
2
≥ US , (ICBH)
and
US ≥ (k + 1) θL − Φ +
B
2
. (ICBL )
Hence, a marriage bonus relaxes (ICBH) but reinforces (IC
B
L ). This does not come as
a surprise. The bonus will make a proposal more attractive for the high-type Sam;
this is a “good thing” and makes the existence of a separating equilibrium more likely.
However, the bonus will also make a proposal more attractive for the low-type Sam
which is a “bad thing”from our perspective.
The condition for separation on Sam’s side is now
(k + 1) θL − Φ + B
2
≤ US ≤ (k + 1) θH − Φ +
B
2
. (4)
This expression shows that the introduction of a marriage bonus shifts the interval of
values for US for which Sam can credibly signal his type to the right.
In addition, the introduction of the bonus B may affect Robin’s best reply. Specifi-
cally, when no information is transmitted, or when she knows for sure that Sam’s type
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is θL, she will continue to refuse marriage or cohabitation only as long as
E [θS ] +
B
2
= λθH + (1− λ)θL + B
2
< UR, (5)
θL +
B
2
< UR < θH +
B
2
. (6)
When B = 0 these conditions are satisfied from assumption (1)–(2) but they may be
violated when B is sufficiently large. Observe that (5) implies θL +B/2 < UR and that
UR < θH +B/2 follows from (2) as long as B > 0. Consequently, Condition (5) implies
Condition (6), but the opposite is not true. In words, (5) requires that Robin continues
to refuse Sam’s proposal to live together if she knew that his feelings are weak, which
is a requirement for the separating equilibrium.
Comparing (3) and (4) and using (5)–(6) establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Signaling with a marriage bonus B > 0) Suppose that kθH > kθL ≥
US , and that (4) holds for B = 0:
(i) Signaling continues to be possible. If B/2 ≤ min{US − (k + 1) θL + Φ;UR − θL}
conditions (4) and (6) are satisfied the separating equilibrium [(aS (θH) = m,
aR (m) = y); (aS (θL) = c, aR (c) = n)] continues to exist with posterior beliefs
λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c) = 0 (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs as λ˜ (aS) = 0
∀aS 6= m).
(ii) Signaling is destroyed. If B/2 > US−(k + 1) θL+Φ, the incentive constraint of
a weakly in love Sam is no longer satisfied so that (4) does not hold and signaling
becomes impossible. Only pooling equilibria survive; specifically, we have:
1. Marriage crowding-out. If US−(k + 1) θL+Φ < B/2 < UR−E [θS ] , then
only a pooling equilibrium with [aS = c ∀θS , aR (c) = n] exists, where poste-
rior beliefs are λ˜ (c) = λ (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs are λ˜ (aS) =
0 ∀aS 6= c). Sam proposes cohabitation irrespective of his feelings and Robin
optimally refuses cohabitation so that the couple always breaks.
2. Marriage crowding-in. If B/2 > max {US − (k + 1) θL + Φ;UR − E [θS ]} ,
then only a pooling equilibrium with [aS = m ∀θS , aR (m) = y] exists, where
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posterior beliefs are λ˜ (m) = λ (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs are
λ˜ (aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= m). In words: Sam proposes marriage irrespective of his
type, and Robin accepts marriage so that all partners get married.
The previous proposition considers the case described in Proposition 1, (i) where
a separating equilibrium exists when B = 0. Not surprisingly, when B is sufficiently
small, the equilibrium is not affected. More surprising results obtain for larger levels of
B, as soon as the incentive constraint of the low-type Sam is violated. Recall that this
constraint is reinforced by the marriage bonus. The bonus then completely destroys
the possibility of signaling (point (ii)). This implies that the marriage subsidy deeply
interferes with the virtuous mechanism according to which a (market) failure induced
by asymmetric information is mitigated thanks to the action (the marriage proposal)
undertaken by partners who are really in love. In this case, only pooling equilibria exist
and there are two possible outcomes.
In case (1) we have a pooling equilibrium with marriage crowding-out which is
equivalent to the one described in point (ii) of Proposition 1. This occurs when B
is sufficiently large to make a proposal attractive to the low-type Sam but not large
enough for Robin to accept the proposal, without information transmission (so that
Condition (5) holds).10 Hence, Sam does not pay the cost of the marriage proposal
and only proposes cohabitation which Robin refuses. While one might expect that a
marriage bonus favors marriages, we obtain exactly the opposite result in this case. To
sum up, the marriage bonus may effectively result in fewer marriages.
The second case occurs when the marriage bonus implies that (5) no longer holds
and a new type of pooling equilibrium with marriage crowding-in emerges (case (2) of
Proposition 2). Sam’s optimal strategy is again aS = m ∀θS . But now Robin accepts
the marriage proposal because remaining with Sam is better than the outside option,
even when no information is transmitted. In this pooling equilibrium all partners stay
together and marry even when Sam’s feelings for Robin are weak.
In all situations described in point (ii) of the proposition, the marriage bonus de-
10This is of course only possible when US − (k + 1) θL + Φ < UR − E [θS ].
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stroys signaling and thus reduces welfare in that either efficient marriages are not con-
cluded (case 1) or inefficient marriages are induced (case 2).
Observe that to assess the impact of B on welfare one has to account for the fact
that the bonus must somehow be financed. To measure welfare with a B different from
zero we thus use the total surplus generated by the concluded marriages (including that
due to B) minus the total cost of financing the bonus. This is equivalent to evaluating
total surplus generated by marriages without counting the B’s in individual utilities.
This proposition provides a rather negative view of the marriage bonus. That a
marriage bonus distorts the decision to get married is not surprising in itself; see the
Kaplow quote in the Introduction. From that perspective two main lessons emerge from
our proposition. First, unlike traditional distortions in taxation theory, the marriage
distortion is not continuous in B; once the critical threshold (B/2 = US−(k + 1) θL+Φ)
is reached, we have a discrete switch involving a drastic change in regime and a complete
destruction of information transmission.11 Second, the sign of the distortion may be at
odds with intuition because the bonus may effectively lead to fewer marriages.
Recall that Proposition 2 assumes that condition (4) is satisfied when B = 0. When
this is not true, a number of mostly trivial cases can arise. One interesting result
emerges, though. Assume that (ICBH) is violated for B = 0. Then, a suitably designed
marriage bonus may have a positive impact and make signaling possible. Recall, that the
interval of US for which condition (4) holds depends onB. For any given US one can thus
find levels of B for which (4) is satisfied. If this can be done without violating (6) then
the bonus induces a separating equilibrium and thus enables information transmission.
Now the sign of the distortion is as expected (a bonus produces more marriages),
and the marriage bonus impacts on the marriage decision in such a way that welfare
increases. Specifically, by making signaling possible it induces efficient marriages.
11Some smoothness may, however, be reestablished at an aggregate level when potential couples are
heterogenous and the parameters, and particularly US , are suitably distributed.
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4 Marriage or cohabitation under a marriage penalty
The previous section has considered the introduction of a marriage bonus and has shown
that it may produce some unexpected results. In particular, it may prevent some mar-
riages from being concluded. We now examine the case where the income taxation
implies a marriage penalty so that B < 0. We study the two cases separately because it
turns out the they are not exactly symmetrical. A marriage penalty will reinforce the
incentive constraint of the high-type Sam but relax that of the low type. It won’t affect
the decision of Robin if she is uninformed, or believes for sure that Sam is of the low
type; in either case she’ll continue to refuse the proposal. However, the penalty may
also make a proposal unattractive which she firmly believes emanates from a Sam who
is strongly in love.
Once again we start with a situation where B = 0 so that the equilibrium entails
separation with marriage. This yields the following counterpart to Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 (Signaling with a marriage penalty B < 0) Suppose that kθH >
kθL ≥ US, and that (3) holds for B = 0.
(i) Signaling continues to be possible. If B/2 ≥ US− (k + 1) θH +Φ (so that (4)
is still satisfied) and if UR < θH +B/2 (so that Robin accepts a marriage proposal
from a deeply in love Sam despite the penalty), there is a separating equilibrium
given by [(aS (θH) = m, aR (m) = y); (aS (θL) = c, aR (c) = n)] with posterior
beliefs λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c) = 0 (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs λ˜(aS) = 0
∀aS 6= m).
(ii) Signaling is destroyed and marriage is crowded out. If B/2 < max{US −
(k + 1) θL+c¯;UR−θH} so that either (4) or the second inequality in (6) is violated,
signaling becomes impossible and only the pooling equilibrium [aS = c ∀θS , aR (c) =
n] exists where posterior beliefs are λ˜ (c) = λ (and possible out-of-equilibrium
beliefs are λ˜ = 0 ∀aS 6= c). Sam proposes cohabitation irrespective of his feelings
and Robin refuses cohabitation so that the couple always breaks.
14
While Proposition 2 described the surprising property that a marriage bonus may
actually prevent some marriages from being concluded, Proposition 3 does not show a
similarly surprising result that a penalty may actually create marriages. But since the
considered reference point is a situation where signaling is possible, it is clear from the
outset that a penalty can only reduce the number of marriages.
However, a penalty can also produce less expected results if we consider a different
reference point. This is illustrated by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Marriage penalty encourages marriage) Suppose that kθH > kθL ≥
US , and that condition (IC
B
L ) does not hold for B = 0 so that signaling is impossible
in the laissez-faire.
If UR− θH < B/2 < US − (k + 1) θL+ Φ, the separating equilibrium [(aS (θH) = m,
aR (m) = y); (aS (θL) = c, aR (c) = n)] exists with posterior beliefs λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c)
= 0 (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs λ˜(aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= m).
Intuitively, this proposition starts from a level of US for which (IC
B
L ), the incentive
constraint of the low-type Sam, is not satisfied. Consequently, both types want to
propose and signaling is impossible. Now, a marriage penalty may lead to an outcome
where a proposal is no longer attractive for a type-θL Sam (whenB/2 < US−(k + 1) θL+
Φ), while remaining the best strategy for type-θH Sam, and where Robin continues to
accept a proposal from a deeply in love Sam despite the penalty (B/2 > UR − θH). In
this situation, the penalty leads to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing
information transmission, which was otherwise not possible.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the impact of a marriage bonus or penalty on the decision to
get married. We have considered a model where two potential spouses play a marriage
proposal game at the end of which they may get married, live together without formal
marriage, or split up. There is asymmetric information between the partners and we
have concentrated on the case where absent of a credible transmission of information the
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couple would split. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but
can indicate strong love (a high quality match). The striking property we obtain is that
within this setting a marriage bonus may actually reduce the probability that a couple
gets married. If the bonus is sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down,
and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer potential couples get married remains.
In this case, the partners, whose union would otherwise be efficient, split. Similarly, a
marriage penalty may increase the marriage probability. Specifically, the penalty may
lead to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission,
which would otherwise not be possible. Our results also imply that marriage decisions
in the laissez-faire are not necessarily privately optimal. In some cases a bonus or a
penalty may effectively make the marriage decision more efficient; it may increase the
number of efficient marriages that otherwise may not be concluded. However, when the
signaling mechanism is operative, unless too small to have an impact, both bonuses or
penalties will make the marriage decision less efficient.
Throughout the paper we have concentrated on a single couple identified by given
parameter values. In reality, these parameters are likely to differ across couples. While
any conjecture about their distribution would be highly speculative, one can expect that
the different cases we have considered (as well as the “trivial” cases we have neglected)
coexist in reality. Consequently, positive and negative effects of the bonus or penalty
may at least in part cancel out through aggregation. This can explain that the empirical
studies mentioned in the Introduction typically find that the tax regime applied to
married couples appears to have little impact on the decision to get married.12 But
even when the effect on the total number of marriages is small, this does not necessarily
mean that the welfare impact of the tax regime is also small.
Turning to policy design, to the extent that the tax system potentially “distorts”a
privately optimal marriage decision, one might think that this is an argument to move
12Chade and Ventura (2002; 2005) offer an alternative and complementary explanation and even
document this result through calibration. They explicitly model the search process so that reservation
levels are endogenous, but once the potential partners have met, they perfectly observe each others
characteristics. We remain agnostic about the search process and consider the outside option as given,
but instead focus on asymmetries of information between the potential partners. Interestingly, the two
approaches yield similar predictions.
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to a more individual based tax. This would mitigate the marriage distortion, which for
the rest has to be balanced against the redistributive benefits of a non-individual tax.
This argument certainly applies when potential couples have full information so that
marriage decisions are (hopefully) privately optimal.13 In our incomplete information
setting it continues to go through for the couples where, for instance, the signaling
mechanism is destroyed by a bonus, or where efficient marriages are crowded out by a
penalty. However, our results show that for other couples it may play in the opposite
direction. So overall, the way the optimal tax system is affect by endogenous marriage
decisions depends on the distribution of parameters in the population.
Our analysis has also ignored children. In other words, we consider fertility decisions
as occurring “downstream”, once our game has been played. This in itself is a reasonable
assumption in that fertility choices only become relevant if the couple does not split
and decides either to get married, or to live in a civil union. However, in reality the
tax treatment of couples is often intertwined with that of children. Children typically
entitle the couple to various tax breaks, but very often these differ between married
and civil union couples. From the perspective of our model this may effectively change
the levels of the marriage penalty or bonus, at least in the case where the potential
partners anticipate their fertility decisions. However, for the rest, this does not change
our analysis.
Appendix
A Alternative interpretation: probability of costly divorce
As an alternative interpretation, let θS ∈ {θL, θH} with θH > θL > 0 denote the
probability that the matching between the two partners is long lasting. This probability
represents the quality of the matching and is observable to Sam only. The matching
of a fraction λ of the existing couples is high-quality (θS = θH), the matching of the
remaining partners is low-quality (θS = θL). This quality determines the two partners’
utility.
13At least from an ex ante perspective.
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Sam chooses the action aS ∈ {0, c,m}, where the strategies have the same inter-
pretation and economic consequences as in the main text. Assume that (1) and (2)
continue to hold. In words, Robin prefers to look for a new partner when the initial
uncertainty about the quality of the matching persists. And she wants to accept Sam’s
proposal if she knows for sure that the matching quality is high (θS = θH), while she
refuses if she realizes that the quality is low (θS = θL).
This alternative interpretation of Sam’s type entails a slightly different specification
of the cost function in the case of marriage proposal. Specifically, the marriage proposal
now costs ϕS(m) = (1− θS)D, where (1− θS) is the probability that the matching
ends and D is the cost of divorce. The expected cost of the proposal is thus lower when
the quality of the matching is high: ϕH(m) < ϕL(m). Here, the marriage proposal
generates a partial commitment to remain together: after marriage, the union can only
be dissolved by paying the cost of divorce. With cohabitation instead the relationship
can be broken without any cost.
Robin’s strategy set and the timing of the game are the same as before, whereas the
two partners’ utilities now are given by
UR = (1− I)UR + IθS ,
US = (1− I)US + I [M − ϕS(aS)] .
The difference from the specification in the main text is that, when Robin and Sam
remain together, Robin’s utility is increasing in the matching’s quality, whereas Sam
always obtains the benefit M, irrespective of the matching quality. Our main results
are obtained for the case where M is large enough to ensure M ≥ US , meaning that
Sam prefers to remain with Robin if the proposal cost ϕS(aS) is not too large.
If the marriage proposal is accepted, Sam’s utility is:
US = M − (1− θS)D = M + θSD −D
which is isomorphic to the one we presented in the main text (US = (k + 1) θS − Φ)
and implies that all our results continue to hold.14 However, here the signaling cost is
14To see that, let us define M = θSM
′ so that US = θSM ′ + θSD −D = θS (M ′ +D)−D. Now, by
setting k+ 1 = M ′ +D implying k = M ′ +D− 1, we return to the specification used in the main text.
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paid only with probability (1− θS) so that this signaling mechanism is Pareto superior
to the one presented in the main text.
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